

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SANAA 01876 01 OF 02 221012Z

12/16

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15

USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-13 OMB-01 SR-02 ORM-03 AID-20

TRSE-00 IGA-02 DRC-01 /178 W
----- 036094

R 220710Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANAA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2759

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCEUR

SECDEF WASH DC

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SANAA 1876

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADD LONDON AS INFO ADDRESSEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: YE, YS, SA, PFOR

SUBJ: CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT ON RECENT POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND FORECAST: A VIEW FROM THE RIGHT

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

SECDEF FOR ISA

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT OF CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY FORE-
CASTS PRIMARY PROBABLE OUTGROWTHS YARG'S LATE SUMMER
POLITICAL CONVOLUTIONS AS: (A) QUEST FOR AT LEAST A
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANAA 01876 01 OF 02 221012Z

SUPERFICIAL DETENTE WITH PDRY, (B) MORE VIGOROUS

ASSERTAION OF YAR NON-ALIGNMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
AND BETWEEN ARAB "PROGRESSIVES" AND CONSERVATIVES,
(C) RE-ENFORCEMENT OF PRESIDENT IRYANI'S POSITION AS
NEUTRAL NATIONAL LEADER WITH STRONGER HAND TO OVERRIDE
FACTIONALISM. ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT NOT WHOLLY PLEASED BY
THESE PROSPECTS.

2. AMBASSADOR CALLED ON PRESIDENT OF YAR CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY
(LEGISLATURE), SHAIKH ABDULLAH BIN HUSSAIN AL-AHMAR,
SEPTEMBER 19 FOR REVIEW OF HIS AUGUST OFFICIAL VISIT TO
MOSCOW AND LATE SUMMER DEVELOPMENTS.

3. ON HIS VISIT TO RUSSIA, SHAIKH ABDULLAH SAID
RUSSIANS HAD BEEN VERY CORDIAL AND HE HAD ENJOYED THE
VISIT AND LEARNING ABOUT A WORLD POWER HE HAD NOT PRE-
VIOUSLY KNOWN AT FIRST HAND. AWARE THAT PRESIDENT
IRYANI'S 1972 VISIT IN QUEST OF ARMS TO UPDATE
YAR INVENTORY, AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF MUHAMMAD IRYANI'S FOLLOW-
UP PLEAS EARLY THIS SUMMER HAD PRODUCED NO RESULTS, HE
HAD DECIDED TO AVOID ALL QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE.

4. AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT'S
EVALUATION OF CAUSES FOR PRESIDENT IRYANI'S RECENT
RESIGNATION AND HIS FORECAST FOR THE FUTURE NOW THAT
PRESIDENT'S TACTIC HAD APPARENTLY SUCCEEDED IN ELICITING
ACROSS-THE-SPECTRUM DEMANDS THAT HE REMAIN IN OFFICE,
WHICH HE EVIDENTLY WOULD. SHAIKH ABDULLAH REPLIED THAT
REASONS FOR PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION MOVE QUITE COM-
PLEX BUT THEY BOILED DOWN TO DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO
CAMPS, ONE CONSERVATIVE (SHAIKH ABDULLAH BEING
ITS LEADER) AND OTHER "LEFTIST", ON TWO POLICY ISSUES.
THE FIRST WAS RELATIONS WITH PDRY. CONSERVATIVE FAC-
TION FELT COMMUNIST PDRY WAS IMPLACABLE ENEMY THAT HAD
TO BE VIGOROUSLY DEALT WITH AS SUCH BY ALL MEANS AT THE
DISPOSAL OF THE YARG AND ITS FRIENDS. "LEFTISTS" HAD
ARGUED FOR RESUMPTION OF UNITY TALKS IN SINCERE PURSUIT
OF UNITY, CALLING A HALT TO PUBLIC TRIALS AND EXECU-
TIONS OF PDRY SABOTEURS, ETC. SECOND POLICY DEVISION
WAS OVER YAR'S PROPER RELATIONSHIP WITH US, JORDAN,
SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN. ON THIS, CONSERVATIVES ARGUED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SANAA 01876 01 OF 02 221012Z

FOR YARG'S CONTINUING TO PLACE FAITH IN US ABILITY DRAW
TOGETHER A COALITION OF YEMEN'S NEIGHBORS THAT WOULD BE
EFFECTIVE IN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. IT SHOULD
ALIGN ITSELF WITH MORE CONFIDENCE SQUARELY WITH SAUDI ARABIA.
OPPOSITION CAMP HAD PORTRAYED YARG'S RELIANCE ON US AND AREA
CONSERVATIVES AS A MISTAKE, SAYING THAT YAR HAD DERIVED
NO TANGIBLE BENEFITS FROM THIS, SAG HAD NO
INTENTION SUPPORT CREATION OF A STRONG NORTH YEMEN;

CONTINUATION OF THIS POLICY ORIENTATION PULLING YEMEN AWAY FROM ITS TRADITIONAL NON-ALIGNMENT AND CREATING UNNECESSARY FRICTIONS WITH COMMUNIST BLOC AND RISK OF SAME WITH ARAB "PROGRESSIVES".

5. SHAIKH ABDULLAH SAID CLEAVAGE BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS HAD DEEPENED THROUGHOUT EARLY SUMMER WITH STEADILY INCREASING FRICTION, NAME CALLING, SUSPICIONS AND DELETERIOUS AFFECT ON GOVERNMENTS'S ABILITY TO GET ITS WORK DONE. BY LATE JULY, PRESIDENT HAD BECOME SICK AND TIRED OF WHOLE MESS AND DECIDED ON HIS I-AM-LEAVING-YOU-CAN-PICK-UP-THE-PIECES TACTIC. IN THE CONFUSION WHICH FOLLOWED, "LEFTISTS" HAD BEEN THE QUICKEST TO ADVANCE THEIR DEMANDS WHICH WERE FOR DISSOLUTION OF PRESENT CABINET, REPUBLICAN COUNCIL AND CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, WITH APPEAL TO PRESIDENT TO RETURN TO PRESIDE OVER THESE "REFORMS". THESE BECAME, IN FACT, THE POINTS MADE BY 37-MAN GROUP WHICH VISITED SYRIA TO APPEAL PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION DECISION. IN SYRIA, ACCORDING TO SHAIKH ABDULLAH, PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED THAT IF THIS WAS GROUP'S CONSENSUS IT SHOULD RETURN TO YEMEN TO CARRY OUT REQUESTED REFORMS ITSELF. WHEN AND IF THESE COMPLETED, HE WOULD CONSIDER RETURNING.

6. SHAIKH ABDULLAH SAID HE HAD DELIBERATELY CONTINUED HIS PLANNED PROGRAM IN THE SOVIET UNION TO AVOID ASSOCIATING HIMSELF WITH GROUP WHICH VISITED PRESIDENT. AFTER ITS DEPARTURE HE HAD GONE TO SYRIA. PRESIDENT, HE HAD FOUND, WAS NOT PLEASED AT EXTREMISM OF PROPOSALS MADE TO HIM ALTHOUGH HE GRATIFIED THAT HIS TACTIC HAD WORKED SO WELL IN PRODUCING A BROADLY BASED APPEAL THAT HE REMAIN IN OFFICE. SHAIKH ABDULLAH SAID HE HAD ADVISED PRESIDENT, IF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 SANAA 01876 01 OF 02 221012Z

HE WISHED PREVENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE "REFORM" PROPOSALS OF WHICH HE REALLY NOT IN FAVOR, RETURN TO YEMEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT RATHER THAN, AS HE HAD THREATENED, PROLONG HIS ALOOF STAY IN SYRIA. PRESIDENT HAD AGREED.

7. AS TO WHERE THESE "THEATRICALS" (SHAIKH ABDULLAH'S WORD) LEFT YARG AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY, CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT SAID PRESIDENT HAS BASICALLY ACHIEVED WHAT HE SOUGHT: UNDISPUTED LEADERSHIP AND CONTROL OVER POLICY. NOW HE IS IN POSITION TO IGNORE EARLIER SPECIAL PLEAS OF OPPOSING FACTIONS AND DETERMINE HIS OWN COURSESOMEWHERE IN-BETWEEN. MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF HIS HAVING WON STRENGTHENED HAND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SANAA 01876 02 OF 02 220912Z

12

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 SR-02 ORM-03 IO-13 EUR-25 TRSE-00

AID-20 OMB-01 IGA-02 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15

USIA-15 ACDA-19 DRC-01 /180 W
----- 035790

R 220710Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANAA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2760

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCEUR

SECDEF WASH DC

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USINT ALGIERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SANAA 1876

WILL BE (A) MOVES TO REDUCE FRICTION WITH PDRY, SUCH AS PUTTING AN END TO TRAINING OF REFUGEES FROM SOUTH AND RESUMING WORK OF UNITY COMMITTEES; (B) EFFORTS TO RETURN YARG TO A MORE CLEARLY NON-ALIGNED POSITION BETWEEN WEST AND SOVIET BLOC AND BETWEEN ARAB "PRO-GRESSIVES" AND CONSERVATIVES. ON THE SOUGHT-FOR DETENTE WITH ADEN, SHAIKH ABDULLAH NOTED, ALGERIA, LIBYA AND IRAQ HAD PROMISED TO USE INFLUENCE WITH PDRY TO INDUCE IT COOPERATE.

8. IN ANSWER AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, SHAIKH ABDULLAH SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE PRESIDENT IRYANI VIEWED ABOVE MOVES AS INDICATING LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN OR FRIENDSHIP FOR US; HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH US. HE ALSO GENUINELY WANTED BEST POSSIBLE ASSOCIATION WITH SAUDI
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SANAA 01876 02 OF 02 220912Z

ARABIA. PRESIDENT WAS STILL OPTIMISTIC THAT US LEADERSHIP WOULD ULTIMATELY SUCCEED IN PROVIDING YAR WITH EFFECTIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE. BUT, SO FAR, PRESIDENT HAD LITTLE IN HAND. WHILE AWAITING RESULTS, HE PREFERRED MOVE YARG BACK TO A LESS EXPOSED AND MORE CLEARLY NEUTRALIST POSTION; THIS, IN ANY CASE, WHERE HE HAS ALWAYS FELT MOST COMFORTABLE.

9. COMMENT: WHILE WE AWARE FROM OTHERS THAT SHAIKH ABDULLAH HAS REPLEDGED HIS LOYALTY TO PRESIDENT, AND HE SAID NOTHING TO INDICATE THE CONTRARY, HE PLAINLY NOT ENTIRELY PLEASED AT OUTCOME OF THIS LATE SUMMER'S EVENTS AND PROSPECTS CREATED BY THEM.

10. PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY FIT WITH ACTING FONMIN ASNAG'S EARLIER HINTS (SANAA 1858) AND COME FROM SOME-ONE WHO HAS DISCUSSED FAIRLY FRANKLY AND FORCEFULLY WITH THE PRESIDENT HIS OPPOSITION TO SUCH UNDRAMATIC AND MODEST BUT NONETHELESS TANGIBLE SHIFTS IN POLICY, WE GIVE WEIGHT TO SHAIKH ABDULLAH'S PREDICTIONS AS TO PRESIDENT IRYANI'S INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS ADEN AND INTERNATIONALITY.

11. FROM US POINT OF VIEW WE THINK RE-ASSERTION OF

PRESIDENT'S PRIMACY AND PREDICTED SUBTLE CHANGES IN DIRECTION ARE NO BAD THING. NON-ALIGNMENT INTERNATIONALLY AND USE OF DIPLOMATIC MANEUVER TO MINIMIZE LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTILITY WITH ADEN HAVE LONG BEEN PRESIDENT IRYANI'S PREFERRED POLICY APPROACHES BUT ONES HE HAD FELT SLIPPING UNDER PRESSURE FROM SAUDI-INFLUENCED CONSERVATIVES. IT NOT IN US INTEREST TO HAVE YAR GET INTO A SCRAP IT CANNOT NOW HANDLE WITH ITS HEAVILY-GUNNED SOVIET-BACKED NEIGHBOR. SIMILARLY AS LONG AS WE CONTINUE GET GOOD COOPERATION IN CARRYING FORWARD US PROGRAMS, AND WE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE WE WILL NOT, A SLIGHT SHIFT TOWARD MORE NEUTRAL POSTURE WILL NOT HURT US. WE MAY HEAR SOME SPEECHES WE DO NOT PARTICULARLY LIKE; DIPLOMATIC COMMUNIQUE MAY CONTAIN SHARPER LANGUAGE ON IMPERIALISM, ETC.

12. ESSENTIALLY, PRESIDENT'S MOVE REFLECTS A SCALING DOWN IN YARG'S EARLIER UNREALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF WHAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SANAA 01876 02 OF 02 220912Z

USG WOULD BE ABLE PROVIDE ITSELF OR THROUGH FRIENDS ONCE DIPLOMAITC RELATIONS RESUMED. THIS REALIZATION

BOTH INEVITABLE AND IN LONGER TERM HEALTHY FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP. IT ENABLES US PROCEED ON OUR COORDINATING EFFORTS IN MILITARY AND OTHER ASSISTANCE IN ATMOSPHERE LESS TROUBLED BY ALTERNATING CRIES OF ALARM AND EXPECTATION OF MIRACLES.

12. THE RUB WOULD COME IN YARG RELATIONS WITH SAG. SAUDIS TEND SEE MATTERS IN BLACK AND WHITE AND ARE NOT ALWAYS SENSITIVE TO STRESSES TO WHICH YARG SUBJECTED. IN APPROPRIATE DISCUSSIONS, WE WILL BE MAKING THE POINT THAT YARG WILL DO WELL TO EXPLAIN ITSELF FULLY TO SAUDIS IF IT WISHES CONTINUE RECEIVE SAG'S GENEROUS FINANCIAL SUPPORT, PROJECT ASSISTANCE AND HOPEFULLY IN THE FUTURE, MILITARY AID AS WELL.
CRAWFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 SEP 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SANAA01876
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: SANAA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730916/aaaaalqg.tel
Line Count: 292
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 DEC 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26-Dec-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <03-Jan-2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT ON RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND FORECAST: A VIEW FROM THE RIGHT
CINCEUR FOR POLAD SECDEF FOR ISA
TAGS: YE, YS, SA
To: SECSTATE WASHDC AMMAN JIDDA KUWAIT TEHRAN CINCEUR WASH DC TRIPOLI
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005